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THE TEXAS LONG-ARM STATUTE, ARTICLE 2031 b:
A NEW PROCESS IS DUE
by Robert Thompson Mowrey
Although the wording of the Texas long-arm statute' has remained
unchanged since the statute's enactment,2 state and federal courts continue to
reexamine it. 3 The events leading up to and surrounding the passage of article
2031b have been adequately treated by Professors Thode and Wilson.4
Moreover, many significant cases involving article 203 lb have been noted.'
I. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 lb (1964). The term "long-arm jurisdiction" refers to
the personal jurisdiction that a court may exert over a non-resident defendant even though he is
not personally served with process within the state.
2. The statute was adopted on May 12, 1959, but did not become effective until 90 days later
on Aug. 10, 1959. Ch. 43, § 9, [1959] Tex. Laws 86.
3. Professor Thode notes that article 2031b was not a factor in litigation in Texas state
courts before the passage of the special appearance rule in TEX. R. CIv. P. 120a because a
defendant either appeared generally, thus waiving jurisdictional objections, or allowed a default
judgment to be taken against him while he remained outside the state. Thode, In Personam
Jurisdiction; Article 2031b, the Texas "Long-Arm "Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance To
Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279, 306 (1964). Thode
predicted that the adoption of the special appearance rule 120a would increase state litigation as
to the scope of article 2031b since a defendant would be able to contest jurisdiction without
submitting himself to the court. Id. Although the Texas courts of civil appeals have been actively
interpreting article 2031 b since the passage of rule 120a in 1962, the Texas Supreme Court has not
ruled on the validity or the scope of article 2031b. See notes 80, 92 infra and accompanying text.
4. See Thode, supra note 3, at 303-10; Wilson, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Non-
Residents: An Invitation and a Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1957). See also Gooch,
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations under Article 2031b, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 214 (1960).
One issue relating to the history of article 2031 b that has not been treated adequately is whether
the statute was meant to be applied prospectively or retroactively: Can jurisdiction be obtained
under article 2031b when the cause of action arose before the enactment of the statute? Most
jurisdictions have held that since long-arm statutes affect substantive rights, they are to operate
prospectively only. See, e.g., Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. 1010, 214 S.W.2d 212 (1948);
Krueger v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 260 Iowa 678, 149 N.W.2d 142 (1967); State ex rel. Clay Equip. Corp.
v. Jensen, 363 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1963). Most Texas courts and federal courts sitting in Texas have
held that article 2031b is both procedural and remedial and can, therefore, be applied retroac-
tively. Muchard v. Berenson, 307 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963); Lone
Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961); McCarty v. Hinman, 342 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1960, no writ). Contra, Rozell v. Kaye, 201 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Tex. 1962); see Annot., 19
A.L.R.3d 138 (1968).
5. 20 TEXAS PRACTICE, R. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 973, 981,989(1973); 2
R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 9.29.5-.6 (1970); A. TODD, DOING BUSINESS IN OTHER
STATES 259-69 (1968); Counts, More on Rule 120a-A Differing Position on Special Appearances,
28 TEX. B.J. 95 (1965); Gooch, supra note 4; Sampson, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Marries the Texas
Family Code, 38 TEX. B.J. 1023 (1975); Thode, supra note 3, at 303-10; Thode, "Long Arm"
Jurisdiction and Special Appearance-A Reply, 28 TEX. B.J. 271 (1965); Vestal, CivilProcedure,
Fifth Circuit Survey, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 467,473-77 (1975); Wilson, supra note 4; 4 HOUSTON L.
REV. 316 (1966); 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 373 (1973); 22 Sw. L.J. 892 (1968); 18 Sw. L.J. 531 (1964); 14
Sw. L.J. 265 (1960); 45 TEXAS L. REV. 188 (1966); 2 TEX. TECH L. REV. 328 (1971). See also
Comment, How Minimum is "Minimum Contact"? An Examination of "Long Arm "Jurisdic-
tion, 9 S. TEX. L.J. 184 (1967). See generally Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21-30
Sw. L.J. (1967-1976); Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21-30 Sw. L.J.
(1967-1976).
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Nevertheless, a need exists for a comprehensive review and analysis of the
statute's interpretation by state and federal courts.
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate how the courts have
interpreted article 2031b in the light of the due process clause, and to focus
upon federal and state decisions which analyze the application of the long-
arm statute to tort cases and litigation which involves parent-subsidiary
corporate relationships. 6 Since this analysis reveals certain shortcomings in
the present statute, a new long-arm statute is proposed.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The story of Pennoyer v. Neff,7 International Shoe Co. v. Washington,8
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 9 and Hanson v. Denckla0 has been told
and retold by students, professors, judges, and practitioners for nearly two
decades." Pennoyer was both the epitome of common law jurisdictional
philosophy 12 and the starting point for understanding the constitutional scope
of a state court's power to adjudicate an issue involving a non-resident
defendant. The decision represented a departure from a tradition of the
physical power concept of jurisdiction 3 because it signaled the application of
due process considerations to jurisdictional questions.14
6. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (1964), which permits exercise of jurisdiction over
non-resident motorists, and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Supp. 1976-77), which permits
exercise of jurisdiction in certain domestic relations, will not be discussed in this Comment. For
an excellent discussion of the new Family Code long-arm statutes see Sampson, supra note 5.
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
10. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
1I. A comprehensive listing of materials relating to these cases would be enormous. Some of
the more noted works include Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 285 (1958); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT.
REV. 241; Johnston, The Fallacy of Physical Power, I JOHN MARSHALL J. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
37 (1967); Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction
of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla-A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958); Scott,
Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV. L. REV. 695 (1959); Seidelson, Jurisdiction over Nonresident
Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long Arm Statutes, 6 DUQUESNE L. REV. 221
(1967-68); Shepherd, How Long is the Long Arm of Due Process?, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 297 (1967);
Thode, supra note 3; Twerski, A Return to Jurisdictional Due Process-The Case for the
Vanishing Defendant, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 265 (1970); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Developments in the Law-
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV L. REV. 909 (1960); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MIcH L. REV. 300 (1970); Comment,
Minimum Contacts Confused and Reconfused- Variations on a Theme by International Shoe-
Or, Is this Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 304 (1970). See also 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 4.25 (2d ed. 1975); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§
1063-69 (1969).
12. But see Ehrenzweig, supra note 11, at 292.
13. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90,91 (1917), in which Justice Holmes said that "[t]he
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." Physical presence has always been significant in
Anglo-Saxon law. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 105 (3d ed. 1923). Unless
the defendant's presence is brought about by the plaintiff's fraud or force, physical presence
alone, no matter how casual or transient, has been and continues to be a proper basis for judicial
jurisdiction. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 97 (1971).
14. Pennoyer's importance as a basis for development of in personam jurisdiction rests in the
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Before International Shoe corporate presence and implied consent were
the traditional bases for jurisdiction over corporations, and the usual bases of
jurisdiction over individuals were physical presence, consent, and domicile. 15
Especially in the area of corporations courts developed legal fictions to
justify the conclusion that a corporation was present within a jurisdiction or
had consented to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.' 6 Transportation
and communication advances accompanied unprecedented economic activity
and the growth of corporate activity. Courts were increasingly called upon to
adjudicate legal issues pertaining to these entities. 17 International Shoe repre-
sented a break from the traditional notions of consent and presence.'" To
submit the Delaware corporation to Washington jurisdiction the Court could
have based its decision on precedent, using fictional consent as presence.
Instead, the Court rejected this analysis 19 and adopted an approach emphasiz-
ing the "quality and nature of the activity in relation. . . to due process, "
20
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"' 21 and the defend-
ant's "minimum contacts" 22 with the forum state. 23 As has been aptly noted,
"the 'minimum contacts' doctrine has the merit of flexibility and the defect of
vagueness.' '24
Although International Shoe is the bedrock of modern in personam juris-
diction, two later cases demonstrate an attempt by the Supreme Court to
clarify and refine that holding. In McGee, the Court's most far-reaching
court's dictum establishing the principle that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit only if it
satisfies the requirements of due process. 95 U.S. at 734-35; see Kurland, supra note II, at 572-73.
15. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 936.
16. Differing theories were developed but the most widely adopted was that one which made
consent to be sued a condition to the foreign corporation's legal transaction of business in the
state. Another theory based the presence of a corporation in the forum state if the corporation
were found to be "doing business." A great body of law developed as to what constituted "doing
business." See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See generally
Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations and Individuals who Carry on Business Within the
Territory, 30 HARV. L. REV. 676 (1917); Fead, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 24 MICH.
L. REV. 633 (1926); Gavin, Doing Business as Applied to Foreign Corporations, 11 TEMP. L.Q. 46
(1936); Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1925); Kurland, supra
note I1, at 577-86; Developments in the Law, supra note II, at 919-23.
17. See Kurland, supra note 11, at 578; Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 999.
18. Three Supreme Court cases foreshadowed International Shoe. Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457 (1940) (defendant's domicile within the state confers jurisdiction); Henry L. Doherty &
Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (doing business by the defendant within the state confers
jurisdiction); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (jurisdiction created by a tort arising out of
the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle on the state's highways).
19. See Kurland, supra note 11, at 586-93.
20. 320 U.S. at 319.
21. Id. at 316.
22. Id.
23. Most significant in International Shoe is that due process requires certain minimum
contacts which do not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id.
Interestingly, the Court also addressed a coalescing problem soon to face it by pointing out that
procedural due process, which requires proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, must not be
violated. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
24. Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California Under New Section 410. 10 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163, 1164 (1970).
25. Two cases came between International Shoe and McGee: Perkins v. Benquet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (jurisdiction could be asserted against non-resident defendant
even though cause of action did not arise out of defendant's activities within the state, provided
19761
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application of International Shoe,25 an in personam default judgment
rendered by a California court against a defaulting Texas corporation was
affirmed. The Court held that the mailing of insurance premium statements
into California by the Texas company satisfied the "minimum contacts"
standard of International Shoe.26 Shortly after McGee, Hanson quieted con-
tentions that McGee established the proposition that any contact with the
state of the forum would be sufficient to support jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant.27 In Hanson the Court held that the "minimum contacts"
test of International Shoe is not met unless the defendant "purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws."28
McGee and Hanson give substance to the International Shoe test of funda-
mental fairness and minimum contacts.2 9 The two cases, however, leave
many in personam questions unresolved. 30 The Supreme Court has, unfortu-
nately, not contributed to clarity in this area, for the Court has not reviewed,
since Hanson, a major case on in personam jurisdiction.
B. The Growth of Long-Arm Statutes
Instead of adding to the list of fictions to bring a non-resident defendant
under the jurisdiction of the forum state, International Shoe announced a
broad test under which a particular factual setting could be examined. The
decision did not automatically vest state courts with the power to obtain
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants but only provided the potential for
an exercise of such power under an appropriate statute.3 A court must first
look to the applicable state law before deciding whether the defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to meet the due process
standard.32
defendant had "substantial," as opposed to "minimum," contacts); Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (sending letters into and receiving them from a state subjected
foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of that state).
26. The Court in International Shoe did not address the issue of whether individuals fell
within the minimum contacts test. McGee settled that query by clearly indicating that non-
resident individuals and corporations would be treated alike. 355 U.S. at 222.
27. See, e.g., Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota Over Absent Defendants, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 909, 922 (1958).
28. 357 U.S. at 253. See also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
29. See generally R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 499-578 (2d
ed. 1975).
30. The Hanson decision has drawn considerable criticism for its analysis. See Hazard,
supra note I1, at 243-44; Kurland, supra note II, at 610-23. But see Scott, supra note II.
3 1. The Supreme Court has indicated that there is no requirement that state courts exercise
the full reach of the jurisdiction constitutionally available. See Perkins v. Benquet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Clarenden Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S.
533, 535 (1922). See alsoThode, supra note 3, at 304; Developments in the Law, supra note Il, at
998-1008. But in accordance with International Shoe's concept of fairness, at what point may a
state deny a plaintiff's suit against a non-resident defendant? Although the development of
long-arm jurisdiction has centered around the expansion of a plaintiff's ability to bring a cause of
action against a non-resident defendant, an interesting question is raised as to the state's power to
restrict its jurisdictional forum: If a state is not required to permit jurisdiction to the constitu-
tional limits of due process, would it be permissible, consistent with due process, for a state to
disallow long-arm jurisdiction completely? See generally R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,
supra note 29, at 535-40; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 13, at 109-13; Developments in the Law,
supra note 11, at 1014-17.
32. See W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 179 (1960); 2 J.
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At the time of International Shoe most state statutes authorizing service
over non-resident defendants were limited in scope.33 After this landmark
decision two methods of implementing the new in personam test began to
emerge. Some state courts reinterpreted old statutes in the light of Interna-
tional Shoe.34 Alternatively, state legislatures passed long-arm statutes which
defined the term "doing business," as that concept was understood after
International Shoe, by listing specific acts which, if done, would support the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 35 At present, all fifty states have some
type of statute permitting jurisdiction to be obtained over a non-resident
defendant. 36 The dichotomy between these two approaches to International
Shoe application should not be oversimplified. A listing of jurisdiction-
producing minimum contacts in a statute is an inflexible approach since the
interpretation of the due process clause is not static. As a result of continuous
judicial interpretation, the second approach may lead to unsatisfactory
results because it relies upon a listing of specific acts. Even statutes passed
with the clear intent of expanding in personam jurisdiction to constitutional
limits may fall behind the expansion or refinement of constitutional interpre-
tation which occurs after their enactment.
II. ARTICLE 203 lb-THE TEXAS APPROACH
A principle universally accepted by the courts construing article 2031b is
that contacts of a non-resident defendant must first satisfy the language of the
long-arm statute before due process requirements can be examined. 37 There-
fore, in examining the interpretation of article 2031 b, the initial consideration
is the actual wording of the statute. The key language of article 2031 b is found
in sections three and four of the statute. Section four defines "doing busi-
ness" as "entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas
MOORE, supra note II, 4.41-1[3]; WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS 133 (CT Corp. Sys.
1973).
In Roumel v. Drill Well Oil Co., 270 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1959), the court refused to extend
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who had an oil lease interest in Texas. Although this
arguably met the minimum contacts required by International Shoe, Texas had not yet enacted a
long-arm statute, thereby foreclosing a jurisdictional forum in Texas. See 14 Sw. L.J. 265 (1960).
33. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (sustained jurisdiction over
non-resident individuals selling corporate securities in state); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927) (upheld Massachusetts non-resident motorist statute). See Developments in the Law, supra
note 11, at 999-1000.
34. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 657, 658-59 (1959).
35. The first truly comprehensive long-arm statute was enacted in Illinois and has served as a
model for other states. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1968). SeeCurrie, The Growth of the Long
Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
36. See A. TODD, DOING BUSINESS IN OTHER STATES (1968) (a collection of long-arm statutes
and selected decisions in each of the fifty states). See also UNIFORM INTERSTATE & INT'L
PROCEDURE ACT § 1.01.
37. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483,492(5th Cir. 1974);Jetco Electronic
Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (5th Cir. 1973); Southwest Indus. Import &
Export, Inc. v. Wilmod Co., 382 F. Supp. 972,974 (S.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 524
F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1975); Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871, 873 (S.D.
Tex. 1971).
Only one state court has specifially alluded to this two-tier analysis, but there is no
indication that the Texas state courts would not adhere to this principle. Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Lumar,
513 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state, or the
committing of any tort in whole or in part in this state." ,38 This section also
contains a phrase39 which inelegantly attempts to expand the definition of
doing business to include acts other than those arising from a tort or con-
tract. 40 Section three states that a non-resident defendant who does not
maintain a place of regular business in Texas or a designated agent may be
served with process through the secretary of state of Texas for "causes of
action arising out of such business done in this state." 41 Therefore, unless
obviated by the catchall phrase, the cause of action must arise out of business
done in the state.
The major problem with article 2031b is that it does require, if taken
literally, that the cause of action arise out of business done in Texas. The
"catchall phrase" is not only inelegant, it literally does not accomplish the
job. Since due process does not require that the cause of action arise out of
"business done in Texas" in all instances, this portion of the statute is in need
of modification. As will be discussed later, 42 the Texas Supreme Court in
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.4 3 held that jurisdiction could not be entertained over a
non-resident unless the cause of action should "arise from, or be connected
with, such act or transaction."4 Since the statute does not include O'Brien's
"or be connected with" phrase, the wording of the statute does not reach the
due process limits defined by the Texas Supreme Court.
A. Due Process Interpretation
In order to determine the boundaries of specific statutory wording, a
statute must be examined against the requirements of due process. An
analysis of a particular statute could determine it to be more restrictive than
the outer limits of due process, beyond the permissible scope of due process,
or reaching the maximum boundaries of due process without violating it. The
first analysis has received little acceptance by the courts, although some
commentators have recognized that article 2031b may be more restrictive
than the far reach of due process. 45 For example, a situation could arise where
a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to meet the due
process standard, but service of process is set aside on the ground that the
long-arm statute does not encompass that particular activity. 46 In Bland v.
38. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4 (1964).
39. The phrase reads: "and without including other acts that may constitute doing busi-
ness." Id.
40. Professor Thode uses the term "catchall phrase" in explaining this portion of the statute.
See Thode, supra note 3, at 308.
41. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (1964). This language is taken from
International Shoe. See 326 U.S. at 319.
42. See notes 95-102 infra and accompanying text.
43. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
44. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
45. See Baade, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 166, 173 (1974);
Counts, supra note 5, at 138; Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
244, 248-49 (1975); Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 166, 172 (1970);
VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 174 (1968).
See also 20 TEXAS PRACTICE, R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, § 973 n. 18. But seeThode, supra note 3,
at 307-08.
46. See WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS, supra note 32, at 133.
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Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.47 a federal district court declined to interpret
the Texas long-arm statute as a statute which subjects a non-resident person
or corporation who conducts business in a state to the jurisdiction of that
state's courts for some claim having nothing to do with its operations in that
state.' Although this is the clearest statement by a court that article 2031b
does not reach the limits of due process, the Bland analysis stressed the lack
of state court directives as to the scope of the statute, but did not actually hold
that the statute itself is more restrictive than the limits of due process. 49 The
same federal district court, in the later case of Hayes v. Caltex Petroleum
Corp.,50 again failed to make the due process inquiry because the facts of the
case did not bring the defendant "within the Texas construction of its Long
Arm Statute."
51
The second analysis attacks article 2031 b for unconstitutional overbreadth
by attempting to demonstrate that the statute encompasses factual situations
that would violate due process if the forum entertained jurisdiction. Most
courts have either rejected 52 or, in the more usual case, evaded the chal-
lenge. 53 In most instances in which a court finds that jurisdiction should not be
extended to a non-resident defendant, the decision is based upon the lack of
sufficient minimum contacts, not the notion that the language of article 203 lb
impermissibly authorizes jurisdiction beyond the constitutional scope of due
47. 338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
48. Id. at 874-75. See also Murdock v. Volvo of America Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Tex.
1975).
49. It is questionable whether courts realize this distinction. For example, in Frito-Lay, Inc.
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973), a federal district court indicated in
dictum that, although it was refusing to extend its jurisdiction to a parent corporation whose
subsidiary had adequate contacts with the forum because the Supreme Court had not interpreted
due process to reach that far, a different conclusion might not violate due process. Id. at 248-49.
The court did not analyze the problem in terms of whether the statute authorized jurisdiction
based on this parent-subsidiary relationship.
See also Tabulating Sys. & Serv., Inc. v. I.O.A. Data Corp., 498 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ), where the court was unclear as to whether jurisdiction was
denied on grounds of statutory construction or insufficient contacts to constitute due process.
Although one commentator concludes that the court interpreted the statute as "relational"
because the plaintiff did not allege a cause of action which "relates to any of the foregoing
contacts in Texas," id. at 694, the court cited as authority for its position O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.,
399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966), a Texas Supreme Court decision which delineated basic dueprocess
considerations rather than construing article 203 1b. See notes 95-102 infra and accompanying
text; Baade, supra note 45, at 170-71; cf. Crothers v. Midland Prods. Co., 410 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ).
50. 332 F. Supp. 1205 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
51. Id. at 1206.
52. See, e.g., Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90, 98 (S.D. Tex. 1963);
Able Fin. Co. v. Whitaker, 388 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, writ dism'd by agr.);
accord, Hull v. Gamblin, 241 A.2d 739, 742-43 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) (construing Texas statute).
53. See, e.g., Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954,956 (5th Cir. 1965); Pliler
v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. (Texas), 197 F. Supp. 212,215, 217 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Sun-X Int'l Co. v.
Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. Bodzin v. Regal
Accessories, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
A determination of the constitutionality of a statute will be avoided if there are other grounds
for deciding a case. See, e.g., Hardin County v. Trunkline Gas Co., 330 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 848 (1965); McKinney v. Blankenship, 154 Tex. 632,282 S.W.2d 691 (1955);
Amaino v. Carter, 212 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1976]
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process.54 In Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp.," a case
arising shortly after passage of the statute, a federal district court held that
when the only jurisdictional allegation concerned one contract to be per-
formed partially in Texas, proof of this allegation would be sufficient to come
within the language of article 2031b. But the court further held that "[a]s
applied to defendant . . . Section 4 of Article 203 1b deprives defendant of
that due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States."56 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court,5 7 holding that the plaintiff should be allowed to
allege other contacts with the forum.58 The court noted that if these additional
allegations were proven, they would more than suffice to satisfy the due
process requirements.59 Thus, the appellate court circumvented the issue of
article 203 lb's possible constitutional overbreadth. 6° Since the federal district
court decision in 1960 indicating that the Texas long-arm statute is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad, no federal or state court has interpreted the statute to be
broader than due process. 6'
A view most frequently expressed by the courts is that the Texas long-arm
statute reaches the limits of constitutional due process. 62 The origin of this
interpretation is found in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Lone Star, which
indicated that "the Texas purpose [in enacting the long-arm statute] was to
exploit to the maximum the fullest permissible reach under federal constitu-
tional restraints. ,63 The courts dealing with this issue after Lone Star have
been in agreement with that holding. 64 Moreover, Professor Thode, in his
much cited commentary on article 2031b, approves of this interpretation.
Regrettably, there is no recorded legislative history as to the intended range of
article 2031b.
This approach places article 203 1b on the same plane with due process. By
viewing the statute and the due process test as synonymous, the courts
implicitly determine that statutory construction is unnecessary and shift the
focus from the language of the statute to a determination of due process
54. See Arthur, Ross & Peters v. Housing Inc., 508 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1975); Amco Trans-
world, Inc. v. M/V Bambi, 257 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Omniplan, Inc. v. New America
Dev. Corp., 523 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ); Tabulating Sys. & Serv., Inc.
v. I.O.A. Data Corp., 498 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ).
55. 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
56. Id. at 56-57.
57. 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961).
58. Id. at 77.
59. Id. at 74.
60. Id. at 73.
61. See, e.g., Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90(S.D. Tex. 1963) (lengthy
discussion of the constitutionality of article 2031b); accord, Able Fin. Co. v. Whitaker, 388
S.W.2d 437, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, writ dism'd by agr.).
62. See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974); Jetco
Electronic Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973); Reich v. Signal Oil & Gas
Co., 409 F. Supp. 846, 849 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 530 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1976);
Reul v. Sahara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995, 997 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Estes Packing Co. v. Kadish &
Milman Beef Co., 530 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ); N.K.
Parrish, Inc. v. Schrimscher, 516 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ).
63. 288 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1961).
64. See cases cited at note 62 supra.
65. See Thode, supra note 3, at 307.
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requirements. Professor Thode recognizes this in writing: "Such an interpre-
tation directs the court's attention immediately to constitutional limitations
rather than to problems of statutory construction that could lead to interpreta-
tions falling short of permissible constitutional limits."I
When the courts state that the Texas long-arm statute reaches "just as far
as Fourteenth Amendment Due Process will permit," '67 they usually are
expressing the idea that has been developed above: article 203 lb is equal to
due process, and statutory construction is unnecessary. In Clark Advertising
Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 68 however, the court stated that the long-arm statute "is
to be given the broadest possible construction, subject only to basic constitu-
tional requirements. ", 69 This approach emphasizes that the wording of the
statute should be construed as broadly as possible, but suggests that due
process may include more than the broadest possible construction of the
statute.° The court failed, however, to analyze the distinction between inter-
preting the statute as synonymous with due process and determining the
broadest possible construction of the statutory wording. 7' In Clark, as in most
cases, this distinction is not essential either to the result of the case or to the
court's analysis. In those cases which do not fit precisely within the language
of the statute the differentiation becomes highlighted. In this situation the
courts, when they remark that the "scope of Article 2031b is as broad as the
constitutional standard" 72 of due process, are stating that the long-arm statute
is equal to due process. Although undeveloped, the approach in Clark is more
precise since it recognizes that the broadest possible construction of article
2031b does not reach the limits of due process.
The view that article 2031 b encompasses everything within the grasp of due
66. Id. The court in Southern Nat'l Bank v. TRI Fin. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Tex.
1970), noted that the adequacy of service should be tested against the Texas long-arm statute. The
court then made this significant remark: "This test, however, reduces to due process, for the long
arm of Texas has as great a reach as due process permits." Id. at 1191. A state court also followed
this reasoning when it indicated: "[Sitatutory construction is not the proper inquiry . [... IThe
proper focus of inquiry is that of the constitutional limitation .. " Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498
S.W.2d 52,56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Product Promotions, Inc.
v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1974) (indicating that since article 2031b represents
an effort to reach as far as due process will permit, most challenges to in personam jurisdiction
will "turn on constitutional considerations").
67. Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd. v. MS Galini, 323 F. Supp. 79, 81 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
68. 331 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 490 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1974).
69. Id. at 1059.
70. If this third analysis is viewed not from the standpoint that article 2031b is equal to due
process, but rather that the statute reaches as far as the permissible limits of due process within
the context of the statutory language, it essentially becomes the first analysis with emphasis on
due process considerations. See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, this
viewpoint is a refutation to the second analysis espoused by Lone Star, if the statutory language is
limited to the outer limits of due process, it cannot be carried any further.
71. Since Clark concerned a fact setting which clearly fell within the wording of 2031 b, the
court easily avoided determining the possible scope of the statute. The court cited Coulter v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970). in support of its statement quoted in the
text. However, the Coulter court remarked that "article 2031 b should be given as broad a reach
as due process will permit any 'Long Arm' statute to be given." Id. at 1316, quoting Eyerly
Aircraft v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 598-99(5th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added). This statement tends to
negate any emphasis on statutory construction. It is doubtful that the Clarkcourt meant anything
different from the court in Coulter.
72. Amco Transworld, Inc. v. M/V Bambi, 257 F. Supp. 215, 217 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
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process has not been carefully considered nor developed by the courts for a
number of reasons. First, although the legislative purpose may have been for
article 203 lb to embrace every conceivable situation allowed by due process,
this purpose is not made clear by the language of the statute itself.73 Some
courts have not recognized the distinction between the intended purpose and
the actual effect of the statute, and have simply held that the purpose of article
2031 b was to reach the maximum limits of due process without going further
to hold that the statute does in fact reach the limits of due process. 74 The
majority of courts now believe that "it is a well-settled fact that the statute
will 'reach [as far] as due process will permit.' ,,75
The second reason for the belief that article 2031 b is indistinguishable from
due process involves the differences in interpretation of the long-arm statute
by federal and state courts. When the Lone Star court first determined that
the purpose of the Texas Legislature was to "exploit to the maximum the
fullest permissible reach under federal constitutional restraints,' '76 the Fifth
Circuit recognized that its determination was bound by the interpretation of
the statute given by the Texas Supreme Court77 The court noted, however,
that in the absence of a special appearance procedure there was a paucity of
Texas court decisions pertaining to article 2031b. 78 When rule 120a was
enacted in 1962 Professor Thode predicted that this special appearance rule
would end the dearth of Texas court decisions. 79 However, the Supreme
Court of Texas has remained silent concerning the breadth of article 2031 b,80
73. Long-arm jurisdiction has recently been extended to the domestic relations area by
another statute. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26 (marital), 11.051 (parent-child) (Supp. 1976-77). If
the legislative intent in enacting article 2031b was to extend long-arm jurisdiction to the limits of
due process, does not due process encompass long-arm jurisdiction in the field of domestic
relations? This rhetorical question is submitted not to demonstrate that §§ 3.26 and 11.051 of the
Texas Family Code are superfluous, but rather to point out the error in attempting to interpret
article 203 1b as encompassing the entire spectrum of due process. See Sampson, supra note 5, at
1026, 1032.
74. See, e.g., Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the court
spoke in terms of the fullest permissible reach analysis, note 63 supra and accompanying text, but
then cited cases which explicitly held that the long-arm statute reaches the limits of due process.
See, e.g., Barnes v. Irving Trust Co., 290 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D. Tex. 1968). But see Product
Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the court stated that
"many, if not most, challenges... will turn on constitutional considerations." This statement
implies that at least some challenges will turn on statutory rather than due process treatment.
However, the Cousteau court cited as authority for its position the case of Gurley v. Lindsley,
459 F.2d 268, 278 (5th Cir. 1972), which held that article 2031b reaches as far as due process
permits.
75. Reul v. Sahara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995, 997 (S.D. Tex. 1974), quoting Atwood
Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms; 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Gurley v.
Lindsley, 459 F.2d 268, 278 (5th Cir. 1972); Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1316
(5th Cir. 1970); Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc. v. U.S. Silver & Mining Corp., 358 F. Supp. 1345,
1347 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Clark Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (N.D.
Tex. 1971), aff'd, 490 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1974); Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52,56 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. 288 F.2d at 73.
77. Id. at 73 n.3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (providing for service on non-residents in manner
prescribed in statute or rule of court of state in which court is held). See also Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536,540(5th Cir. 1964); 1 W. BARRON &
A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 32, § 179, at 696.
78. 288 F.2d at 73 n.3; cf. Acme Eng'rs v. Foster Eng'r Co., 254 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1958).
79. See Thode, supra note 3, at 306.
80. The most significant Texas Supreme Court decision concerning article 2031b is Mc-
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and relatively few decisions by the state civil appeals courts,81 in comparison
to decisions by federal district courts and the Fifth Circuit,82 have dealt with
the relationship between article 2031b and due process.
In Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd. 3 the Fifth Circuit stated that it
had "no desire actually to construe Article 2031b before the Texas courts
have had a chance to do so. "I Lone Star was decided before the enactment of
rule 120a, but Jack Tar was decided in 1965, three years after special appear-
ance was made available. Since the Jack Tar decision made no reference to
the "Texas purpose," it was possible that the Fifth Circuit was momentarily
retracting from its Lone Star position, hoping that the allowance of special
appearance would provide the Texas courts an opportunity to speak on the
breadth of article 2031 b. 85 By 1970, however, there had been no word from the
Texas Supreme Court,86 and in Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 87 the Fifth
Circuit announced that " 'article 2031 b should be given as broad a reach as
due process will permit any "Long Arm" statute to be given.' "88 Two years
later, in Gurley v. Lindsley,89 the court used the catchall phrase in section four
of the statute 9° to justify the expansion of the "jurisdictional scope of the
statute to constitutional limits." 91 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Texas
has remained silent,9 2 and only one Texas court of civil appeals has gone so far
as to say that "[t]he rule is now entrenched in the federal courts, and we are in
Kanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965), which makes no mention of the due process issue.
Rather, the case discusses the procedural aspects of the statute. Cf. Whitney v. L & L Realty
Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1973); Collins v. Mize, 447 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1969).
81. See, e.g., Estes Packing Co. v. Kadish & Milman Beef Co., 530 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ); N.K. Parrish, Inc. v. Schrimscher, 516 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ); Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Sys., Inc., 480
S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
82. See note 62 supra.
83. 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965).
84. Id. at 956. See also Pliler v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. (Texas), 197 F. Supp. 212, 215 (S.D.
Tex. 1961), in which the court refused to speculate about the constitutional due process limits of
article 2031b.
85. There were no other Fifth Circuit decisions pertaining to article 2031b between the
enactment of rule 120a and the Jack Tar case.
86. In a footnote the Fifth Circuit in Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357
F.2d 847, 849 n.3 (5th Cir. 1966), made this significant remark: "The Supreme Court of Texas has
now promulgated a rule of procedure . . . to permit a special appearance thus making it
unnecessary, and in many ways now inappropriate, for us to be 'making' Texas law on jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents, a responsibility foisted on us." (Emphasis added.)
87. 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970).
88. Id. at 1316, quoting Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 598-99 (5th Cir. 1969).
89. 459 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1972).
90. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
91. 459 F.2d at 278. See also Amco Transworld, Inc. v. MV Bambi, 257 F. Supp. 215, 217
(S.D. Tex. 1966). Professor Thode also uses this catchall phrase to justify his conclusion that
article 2031b expands to the limits of due process. Thode, supra note 3, at 307-08.
92. In one sense, however, the supreme court may be said to have spoken. TEX. R. Civ. P.
108, which provides for service on a non-resident defendant, was amended by the Texas Supreme
Court in 1975 becoming effective on Jan. 1, 1976. The last sentence of the rule reads: "A
defendant served with such notice shall be required to appear and answer in the same manner and
time and under the same penalties as if he had been personally served with a citation within the
state to the full extent that he may be required to appear and answer under the Constitution of the
United States in an action either in rem or in personam." (Words in italics were added by the 1975
amendment.) The court remarked that the purpose of the amendment "is to permit acquisition of
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agreement, that the reach of art. 2031b is limited only by the United States
Constitution. "93
B. Three Tests for Due Process
The federal courts must follow state laws in interpreting the Texas long-arm
statute. 94 Due to the lack of an indication from the Texas Supreme Court as to
the construction of the statute, and the increasing acceptance of the idea that
article 2031 b is equal to due process, the courts have focused primarily on the
due process question. Since this is a constitutional inquiry rather than an
examination of state law, various criteria have been developed by the federal
as well as state courts to determine if fact situations meet the requirements of
due process.
A decision by the Texas Supreme Court, O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 95 has been
repeatedly employed by federal96 and state civil appeals courts97 to analyze
due process. The issues in O'Brien were whether Texas should give full faith
and credit to a judgment from Illinois and whether the Illinois court hadjurisdiction over the defaulting Texas corporation against whom it had
rendered a default judgment. The Texas court initially acknowledged that
"the validity of the Illinois judgment is controlled by the law of Illinois
.... ,"98 After reviewing International Shoe and McGee, the court quoted
in personam jurisdiction to the constitutional limits." See Civil Procedure Rules Amended-
Official Court Order, 38 TEX. B.J. 823,824 (1975). In a letter to the editor of the Texas Bar Journal
Professor Hans Baade of the University of Texas School of Law argues that rule 108 "is an
impermissible extension of the Texas long-arm statute." 38 TEX. B.J. 988 (1975). He points out
that long-arm jurisdiction has been determined by the legislature in its enactment of article 2031 b
and that for the court to attempt to amend rather than to implement article 2031 b is constitution-
ally impermissible. Id. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25. If the Texas Supreme Court had previouslyjudicially interpreted article 203 1b as reaching the limits of due process, the amendment to rule
108 could scarcely be viewed as an improper procedural device.
Professor William V. Dorsaneo III of Southern Methodist University in his forthcoming book,
TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE ch. 32, to be published by Matthew-Bender, argues that amended rule
108 can be reconciled with article 203 1b for at least two reasons. First, amended rule 108 merely
provides for the possibility of an alternative method of service of process from article 2031 b, § 1,
which provides for service of process upon the secretary of state for a nonresident. The
amendment speaks to the method of process and does not address the interpretation of "doing
business." Second, the amendment of rule 108 provides for a means of effecting service of
process under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Supp. 1976-77), since these new long-arm
statutes under the Family Code do not provide for a method of service of process. Although
Dorsaneo doubts the first rationale for the amendment, he contends that the second reason is
more probable.
Before the 1976 amendment rule 108 had been held not to confer long-arm jurisdiction. See
Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Evans Advertising Agency, Inc., 450 S.W.2d 769,
770-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); American Institute of Real
Estate Appraisers v. Hawk, 436 S.W.2d 359, 365-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968,
no writ).
93. Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
94. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
95. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
96. See, e.g., Arthur, Ross & Peters v. Housing, Inc., 508 F.2d 562,564(5th Cir. 1975); Bland
v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871, 874 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
97. See, e.g., Estes Packing Co. v. Kadish & Milman Beef Co., 530 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Law, Snakard, Brown & Gambill v. Brunette, 509
S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
98. 399 S.W.2d at 341.
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the Washington Supreme Court's 99 establishment of three basic factors which
should coincide if jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation is to be
entertained:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully
do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
(2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or
transaction; and
(3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration
being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum
state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection
of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the
basic equities of the situation."0
Deciding that the Illinois judgment should be given full faith and credit, the
court emphasized that the Illinois law and not the Texas law was on point.,0
Nevertheless, courts rarely mention that O'Brien was a full faith and credit
decision concerning Illinois law; rather, courts use the decision to analyze
factual settings under article 203 lb. 102 Such an approach to interpretation of
article 203 lb is faulty because O'Brien merely determined due process limits
and did not even consider a construction of the Texas statute.
In some instances federal courts have adopted other due process tests
which are consistent with the O'Brien test but which emphasize other consid-
erations. A federal district court in Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co."°3
indicated that the factors to be considered in determining whether due proc-
ess is satisfied are: (1) the nature and character of the business; (2) the number
and type of activities within the forum; (3) whether such activities give rise to
the cause of action; (4) whether the forum has some special interest in
granting relief; and (5) the relative convenience of the parties.I°4 The Hearne
test has been used by many federal district 10 5 and state civil appeals courts"°
in deciding whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the
forum to exercise jurisdiction.
Recently, a third test for determining whether due process is met was
99. Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106,381 P.2d 245,251(1963).
100. 399 S.W.2d at 342. See generally Note, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Corporation Based
on a Single Act: A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEO. L.J. 342 (1958).
101. 399 S.W.2d at 343.
102. See, e.g., N.K. Parrish, Inc. v. Schrimscher, 516 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1974, no writ). See also Tabulating Sys. & Serv., Inc. v. I.O.A. Data Corp., 498 S.W.2d
690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ); National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Sys.,
Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455,459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sun-X Int'l Co. v.
Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
103. 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
104. Id. at 99. These factors were first enumerated in Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen
Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48, 56 (S.D. Tex. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir.
1961).
105. See Odom v. C.R. Thomas, 338 F. Supp. 877,878-82 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Jetco Electronic
Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 325 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 473 F.2d
1228 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Bragea, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 658, 659-60 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd,
497 F.2d 67, 77 (5th Cir. 1974).
106. See Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Country Clubs, Inc. v. Ward, 461 S.W.2d 651,657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
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developed by the Fifth Circuit in Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau.07
This test includes only two factors and represents a change from O'Brien and
Hearne in at least one significant area. The court's dual test is: "First, 'there
must be some minimum contact with the state which results from an affirma-
tive act of the defendant.' Secondly, 'it must be fair and reasonable to require
the defendant to come into the state and defend the action.' "108 Although this
test does not expressly include factors such as "the quality, nature, and
extent of the activity in the forum state" and "whether the forum has some
special interest in granting relief," these are tacitly included in Cousteau's
"minimum contact" and "fair and reasonable" standards."° However, the
criterion of whether the cause of action arises from the contacts with the
forum is notably missing.
The O'Brien, Hearne, and Cousteau tests were all derived either in whole or
in part from the leading United States Supreme Court decisions concerning in
personam jurisdiction. " 0 The O'Brien test, however, is more restrictive than
the tests developed in federal courts. To the extent that O'Brien has given
assistance in construing article 2031b, an unnecessary limitation has been
placed on in personam jurisdiction since the test requires that "the cause of
action must arise from, or be connected with""' the act or transaction.
Further, O'Brien has been incorrectly used by Texas courts as the Texas
Supreme Court's construction of article 2031 b. The tests developed in Hearne
and particularly in Cousteau are more desirable than the O'Brien test because
they permit a flexible approach which involves a consideration of all the
relevant factors in determining due process. Justice Goldberg, author of the
opinion in Cousteau, aptly noted: "[N]o one formulation of the constitutional
test could possibly encompass all the potentially important factors, nor could
a formula perform the crucial task of weighing and balancing the relevant
considerations." " 2
III. INADEQUACIES OF ARTICLE 2031b AND A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
In many factual situations the possible incongruity between the language of
107. 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
108. Id. at 494; see2 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 4.25[5].
109. The Cousteau court recognizes the O'Brien and Hearne tests but does not accept them.
495 F.2d at 494 n.17.
110. See notes 15-28 supra and accompanying text. The first O'Brien consideration was
clearly taken from Hanson. The first Cousteau criterion is a combination of International Shoe
and Hanson while the second is a combination of International Shoe and McGee. The third
O'Brien factor and most of the Hearne test were derived from the idea in International Shoe of
"fair play and substantial justice." The test of whether the cause of action arises out of the
contacts with the forum is supposedly derived from Hanson. Although the Hanson court
recognized that the cause of action was unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state, this
was dictum, having dubious impact on the result. 357 U.S. at 251-52. See generally Kurland, supra
note 11, at 610-23. It is far from clear that this is a correct interpretation of this case. In discussing
whether due process permits a forum to entertain jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
whose contacts with the state are unrelated to the cause of action, the Supreme Court in Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952), remarked that due process neither
"prohibits" nor "compels" the courts to exercise jurisdiction. Although the Court's decision is
less than clear, it generally rested its decision on fairness, thereby adding little to International
Shoe. Id. at 443-47. See generally Kurland, supra note 11, at 598-606.
111. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
112. 495 F.2d at 499.
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the statute and due process is inconsequential. In a case that obviously
concerns a tort or contract, a court can state the principle that article 203 1b is
as broad as due process and then proceed to determine if there are sufficient
"fminimum contacts" as required by due process. Analytical problems arise
when the courts are faced with a situation that does not appear to come within
the terms of the statute. But, because the thought has become so "well
entrenched"' 13 that the long-arm statute is equal to the test of due process,
courts simply state that proposition and move quickly to the due process
analysis, thus avoiding statutory construction. This section demonstrates
how that passage, although at times producing equitable results, has created
strained and faulty analysis in certain situations.
A. Torts
Negligence and Products Liability. There are two significant themes that have
been developed by the courts in negligence and products liability cases. The
first is the "stream of commerce" theory which was initially developed in
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp."4 The second inter-
twines with the first, and concerns the issue of whether the cause of action
must arise out of the defendant's contacts with the forum.
The stream of commerce analysis normally involves the situation in which a
manufacturer introduces a product into the stream of commerce and an injury
results from the product in a state other than the manufacturer's residence. A
federal district court first dealt with this issue in Hearne when a Texas
resident was injured as the result of a faulty valve manufactured by the
non-resident defendant. In analyzing whether the facts came within article
2031 b, the court recognized the distinction between "tortious act" and "a tort
committed in whole or in part," the former being more restrictive than a
"tort.""I5 Concluding that the Texas statute is broader than those which only
specify "tortious act, ' "16 the court held that "for the purpose of determining
the applicable state substantive law the place of the tort is the place of the
injury and not the place of wrongful act or omission. " 17 The court went on to
explain that the "in part" phrase of artible 2031b was intended to "include a
situation where the operative wrongful act occurs in another state but the
injury occurs in Texas."I" The Hearne decision greatly extended the jurisdic-
113. Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
114. 22 III. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
115. 224 F. Supp. at 95.
116. See McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. I11. 1961). The Hearne
court reasoned that since the Illinois "tortious act" statute was more restrictive than article 2031 b
and the Illinois Supreme Court in American Radiatorhad sustained jurisdiction in a similar fact
situation, article 2031 b's "tort in whole or in part" would certainly encompass the case at bar. But
see Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68,261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965) (New York court
considering a fact setting similar to American Radiator held jurisdiction not obtainable under a
"tortious act" statute). Following this decision, New York amended its statute. N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1976-77).
117. 224 F. Supp. at 96. But cf. Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.
1968) (Texas wrongful death statute could not be given extraterritorial effect because it had been
construed for eighty years in accordance with the usual canon that a statute is presumed to have
no extraterritorial application unless it contains an express provision to that effect).
118. 224 F. Supp. at 96; accord, Hull v. Gamblin, 241 A.2d 739 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968)
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tion of the Texas courts to allow service on manufacturers who neither sold
products within Texas nor had any direct contact with Texas. "9 However, the
court properly considered the language of article 2031b before giving an
expansive definition to the tort concept.120
The stream of commerce theory was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Eyerly
Aircraft Co. v. Killian 2' where the Oregon defendant had manufactured an
amusement ride twenty years before the cause of action arose. The machine
was taken to many states before finally entering Texas where it caused injury.
Basing its reasoning more on a due process analysis than on statutory con-
struction, the court concluded that the defendant had "reason to know or
expect that its product would be brought into the state where the injury
occurred.' 12 The court also founded its decision on certain contacts of the
defendant with Texas which were unrelated to the cause of action. 23 If the
defendant's unrelated contacts were alone sufficient to sustain jurisdiction, 124
this appears to be contradictory to the actual wording of article 203 lb which
states that the cause of action must arise out of the non-resident's activities
within the forum. 125 The court, however, did not discuss this issue. The
defendant in Eyerly contended that the second element of the O'Brien due
process test 126 forbade the exercise of jurisdiction since the cause of action
was not related to the defendant's activities. 27 The court gave three reasons
for the inapplicability of O'Brien: the O'Brien case involved the Illinois
long-arm statute, not article 203 lb; the Texas Supreme Court was discussing
due process limits on long-arm service of process, not statutory limits; and the
Washington case on which O'Brien was based was distinguishable on its
facts. 128 Not only was the Eyerly court questioning the validity of O'Brien as a
source of Texas authority, but it was also questioning O'Brien's test for due
process in examining any long-arm statute.129
(construing article 2031 b); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 37, 50 (197 1). See
also 2 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 4.15[5].
119. See 18 Sw. L.J. 531, 532 (1964).
120. See notes 103-06 supra for Hearne's discussion of due process.
121. See Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 146, 146-48
(1971).
122. 414 F.2d at 596. See Garza v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., 496 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ), which presented a similar factual situation to Eyerly but
because there was no proof that the defendant either "manufactured, assembled, or sold the
subject amusement ride," jurisdiction was not sustained. Id. at 146. SeealsoTaylorv. American
Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ).
123. The court indicated that these unrelated contacts, such as sales and deliveries of
amusement devices and parts directly into the state, were "neither occasional nor sporadic-they
were both continuous and substantial." 414 F.2d at 594-95.
124. The court held that the defendant's "contacts with Texas were substantial enough to
constitutionally support Texas' assertion of 'Long Arm' in personam jurisdiction over it." Id. at
597. In the next sentence, the court indicated it was basing its holding on the dual grounds of
stream of commerce and the defendant's unrelated contacts with Texas. Id.
125. Recognizing that there was authority for the theory that the commission of a single tort
without further contacts would not contravene due process, the court refused to mark the limits
of such theory. Id. at 597-98; cf. Mehaffey v. Barrett Mobile Home Transp., Inc., 473 S.W.2d 643
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ) ("isolated, one-shot transaction" of defendant's
employee did not make the defendant "present").
126. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
127. 414 F.2d at 599 n.12.
128. Id. at 599-600 n.12.
129. Discussing the second element of the text in Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods.,
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Another products liability decision by the Fifth Circuit was Coulter,3°
where the plaintiff was injured by a TV set purchased at Sears, Roebuck and
Co. but manufactured and supplied to Sears by the non-resident defendant.
Relying on Eyerly, the court held that the stream of commerce analysis was
sufficient to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. The Coulter court
emphasized that the volume of business done by the defendant in Texas, the
pattern of product distribution, and the foreseeability of the product's enter-
ing the forum were notable factors in determining whether to entertain juris-
diction. 3 ' The court also remarked that because the defendant had knowledge
that its products reached Sears in Texas, its contacts with the forum were
stronger than were those of the defendants in Eyerly.132
The answer to the question of whether the cause of action must arise from
the defendant's contacts with the forum is still in a state of flux. In an early
decision, Pliler v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. (Texas),133 the court held in this
action for wrongful death that the defendant's contacts with Texas were
insufficient to exercise jurisdiction when the cause of action was unrelated to
those contacts. The contacts of the Pliler defendant with the forum appeared
to be sparse. But in Odom v. Thomas,'34 where a Texas plaintiff brought suit
against an Alabama resident for an automobile-truck collision in Arkansas,
the court stated: "It is clear that the defendant's contacts with Texas are not
insubstantial, and certainly must be deemed sufficient to justify his amenabil-
ity to process in Texas but for the unbridgeable gap separating defendant's
activities in Texas from the incident involved in this litigation. ' 135 A few
weeks later in Bland, a decision concerning breach of contract, the same
court indicated that the reason the court could not subject a non-resident
defendant to its jurisdiction when the cause of action was not related to the
defendant's contacts with the forum was not because due process would be
violated if it did so, but because the federal courts are required to follow state
law and Texas had declined to speak on this issue. 136
To further add to the confusion, the Fifth Circuit in Jetco Electronic
Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner37 held that because the cause of action was
Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245(1963), from which O'Brien was derived, a commentator made
this remark: "[T]he requirement seems to have a statutory base in the provision for jurisdiction
as to 'any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts.' "Trautman, Long-Arm and
Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in Washington, 51 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1975). See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.28.185(1) (1962). See generally Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and
the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REV. 300 (1970).
130. See 2 TEX. TECH L. REV. 328 (1971).
131. 426 F.2d at 1318.
132. Id. at 1318, 1320; cf. Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 658, 659 (S.D. Tex. 1970),
aff'd, 497 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1974) ('"[K]nowledge, rather than the place where the injury actually
occurred,. . .should be determinative on the question of Bender's [defendant's] amenability to
process."). See also Jetco Electronics Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973),
where there was no question of the defendant's negligence, yet the defendant contended that
there had been too many intervening factors for the foreseeability test to be met. The court
rejected this argument, holding that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of
the injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 1232-33.
133. 197 F. Supp. 212 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
134. 338 F. Supp. 877 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
135. Id. at 878.
136. 338 F. Supp. at 875; see notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
137. 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973).
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unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum, a prima facie showing
that the defendant committed a tort in whole or in part in Texas would be
required in order to exercise jurisdiction. As in Eyerly, the court fell back into
a dual analysis, leaving uncertainty as to whether the unrelated contacts were
sufficient or necessary to entertain jurisdiction.' 38 The court in Jetco noted
that the defendant's contacts with Texas were neither as "substantial" nor
"continuous" as those of the defendants in Eyerly or Coulter, in that the
defendant had held only two jobs in Texas within a five-year period . 39
Nevertheless, the court held that the "fairness" test of due process was
met. 140 Again, the court did not discuss article 203 lb in relation to whether the
cause of action must be related to the defendant's contacts with the forum,
but analyzed the fact situation only in terms of due process.
The Fifth Circuit has recently affirmed, without opinion, Reich v. Signal
Oil & Gas Co.,' 4' a case involving the crash of a helicopter off the coast of
Ghana. One defendant challenging jurisdiction was an Italian manufacturer
who had no contact with Texas except that it had built the helicopter accord-
ing to the design of a Texas company. The other defendant, an English
corporation challenging Texas as a forum, had leased the helicopter from the
Italian corporation. The helicopter was never in Texas prior to the accident,
but some testing of the helicopter was performed in Texas subsequent to the
crash. Although the English defendant had "numerous and substantial con-
tacts with Texas,"'4 the court held that it could not entertain jurisdiction
because the contacts were unrelated to the cause of action.' 43 The court
distinguished Coulter and Eyerly by finding that operation of the helicopter in
Texas was not foreseeable.144
In reaching this conclusion, the Reich court may have answered the ques-
tion that both Eyerly and Jetco left unresolved. According to Reich the
defendant's unrelated contacts, although "substantial," are not alone suffi-
cient to exercise jurisdiction. The Reich court employed a trilogy of ques-
tions. The court first asked whether the defendants' activities fell "within the
strictures of the state statute." '145 Although it concluded that they did not, the
court circuitously reasoned that the defendants were not "doing business" as
statutorily defined because the requirements of due process were not satis-
fied. 146 The next two inquiries were the tests developed in Cousteau: whether
there are "minimum contacts," and whether it would be "fair and reasonable
to require the defendant to litigate in this forum." 47 The court found that the
Italian corporation met neither test. The English corporation, however, had
satisfied the first prong of Cousteau, but the court thought the fact that the
138. Id. at 1232, 1234.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1234-35.
141. 409 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1976).
142. 409 F. Supp. at 849.
143. Id. at 850.
144. Id. The court refused to sustain jurisdiction over the Italian corporation on the same
ground. Id. at 851-52.
145. Id. at 849.
146. Id. at 850.
147. Id. at 849.
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English corporation was not a stranger to Texas did not make Texas a more
convenient forum. 148 This analysis emphasizes concepts similar to forum non
conveniens principles expressed in Hearne.
Although the Hearne court correctly looked to the wording of the statute
before giving an expansive definition to the tort concept, most courts analyze
both the theories of stream of commerce and the relationship of the cause of
action with the contacts of the defendant from the standpoint of due process.
In Reich, for example, lip service was given to the literal language of the
statute, but in actuality the court reasoned in terms of due process. If the
courts begin to adopt the theory that jurisdiction can be exercised over a
defendant even if the cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's contacts,
this principle, while it might not "fly in the face of due process,"' 149 will
confuse the literal meaning of article 203 lb. On the other hand, if the "fair and
reasonable" test of Cousteau is applied as was done at least partially by the
court in Reich, the emphasis shifts to this inquiry rather than the inquiry of
whether the cause of action is related to the defendant's contacts. This
distinction is important because if there are enough current, purposeful,
although unrelated, contacts with the forum, the defendant is "present," and
it is, therefore, fair to expect the defendant to litigate in Texas regardless of
where the liability producing act, injury, or damage took place. 150
Fraud. Clearly, if the defendant while personally present in Texas makes
representations which become the basis for an action in fraud by the plaintiff,
the exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant is proper.'5' A
more complex issue is raised when the misrepresentation is made in another
state. In Hoppenfeld v. Crook 52 the court noted that a fraud is not actionable
until relied upon to the detriment of the person to whom the representations
were made. The exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant was sustained;
although the misrepresentation had been made in New York, the reliance by
the plaintiff occurred in Texas. 153 This analysis is consistent with the idea that
148. Id. at 851.
149. Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871, 875 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
150. Other Texas cases involving causes of action in negligence and article 2031b include
Ranger Ins. Co. v. United Housing of New Mexico, Inc., 488 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1974) (Texas
insurer could obtain jurisdiction over non-resident insureds when plane crash occurred in Texas);
Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965) (personal injuries); Reul v.
Sahara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (tank explosion); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (no jurisdiction over parent corporation in action
based on patent infringement in that the parent and subsidiary corporations were separate
entities); Frye v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 523 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ)
(where defendant's only contacts with Texas were plane stops on an unscheduled basis under
orders of the Atomic Energy Commission, defendant's activities did not rise to, nor bear relation
to, cause of action outside of Texas); Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (irrelevant that tort action does not arise out of
defendant's contacts with forum if the defendant has consented to jurisdiction under Texas
statute).
15 1. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and
Reason versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REV. 1 (195 l); Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 24, at
1203-04.
152. 498 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
153. Id. at 56. See also Geodynamics Oil & Gas, Inc. v. U.S. Silver & Mining Corp., 358 F.
Supp. 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (reliance on defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation was "opera-
tive fact"); Southern Nat'l Bank v. TRI Financial Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Tex. 1970),
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the tort is committed not where the wrongful act takes place but where the
injury occurs. 5 4
Defamation.' In Texas defamation is defined by statute 15 6 and may not be
altered by a judicial decision. 57 In Jetco the non-resident defendant had
advertised a treasure hunting device in a catalogue magazine. Plaintiffs
brought suit against the defendant, alleging that the catalogue made libelous
statements. Relying on the proposition that the cause of action was unrelated
to the contacts of the defendant with the forum, the court held that plaintiffs
must present a prima facie case of libel in order for the court to exercise
jurisdiction. 158 The Texas defamation statute was satisfied since the allegedly
false test reports concerning the plaintiffs' treasure hunting device could
injure the plaintiffs' reputation and expose them to financial injury.159
In Curry v. Dell Publishing Co. 160 the defendant corporation published an
allegedly libelous article. The corporation had purchased the article from a
freelance writer, included the article in its magazine, and then sold the
magazine to a wholly owned subsidiary. Although the court found that the
plaintiff had failed to plead the case correctly, thereby causing service on the
defendant to be unjustified,161 it questioned the effect of a parent-subsidiary
relationship on a finding of jurisdiction over the parent corporation. 62
B. Parent-Subsidiary Corporations
In recent years there has arisen an increasing number of cases which
question whether a parent corporation can be subjected to the jurisdiction of
the forum solely because of its relationship to a subsidiary which is "doing
modified sub noma. Southern Nat'l Bank v. Cratco, Inc., 458 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1972) ("reliance
wholly in Texas"); accord, Hull v. Gamblin, 241 A.2d 739 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) (in construing
article 203 lb, Texas court had jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in action for fraud based
on advertisement in Texas telephone directory).
154. See note 117 supra and accompanying text. See also Smith v. Reynolds, 533 S.W.2d 861
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
155. Principal defamation cases of the Fifth Circuit, involving jurisdictional questions but not
specifically relating to Texas, include: Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.
1967); New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966). See generally Comment, Constitutional Limitations to
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 436 (1967); Comment,
Lono-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 342
(1967).
156. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5430 (1958).
157. Deen v. Snyder, 57 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932, no writ).
158. 473 F.2d at 1233.
159. Id.
160. 438 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
161. The plaintiff did not affirmatively allege that the defendant "does not maintain a place of
regular business in this State, or a designated agent upon whom service of citation may be made."
438 S.W.2d at 890. The court based its decision on McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.
1965), which is still controlling in the Texas state courts. See, e.g., Prine v. American Hydrocar-
bons, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ). The federal courts, however,
have viewed the McKanna decision as relating to procedural matters and have chosen to apply
the federal rules. See Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 603-04 (5th Cir. 1969).
162. 438 S.W.2d at 891. For additional cases concerning article 2031b and defamation see
Harris v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 405 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (broadcasting system is doing business in those states where its programs are
carried); Mulcahy v. Cohen, 377 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd




business" within the state. The imputed contact theory between parent and
subsidiary corporations is a response to an argument that a non-resident
corporate entity which is part of a cohesive economic unit and derives
benefits from the activities of its affiliate should be subjected to in personam
jurisdiction in Texas. Since the focus of article 2031 b is "doing business," the
courts have interpreted the parent-subsidiary relationship in that manner,
relying primarily on theories of agency, control, and alter ego rather than
upon article 2031b's definition of doing business which speaks in terms of
contracts, torts, and "other acts."
The general rule has been that the relationship of the parent and subsidiary
corporations is not itself a sufficient basis for subjecting the non-resident
parent corporation to the jurisdiction of the forum state. 63 If the court finds
that the parent and subsidiary corporations are not separate entities or that the
subsidiary is acting as an agent for the parent corporation, jurisdiction has
been exercised over the parent. The few Texas civil appeals cases that have
dealt with this issue have held that as much as 100 percent stock ownership of
a corporation does not suffice to subject the stockholder to the jurisdiction of
the court. 65 The court in Curb Cone, Inc. v. Wood 66 recognized this principle
but went on to uphold jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant on the
stream of commerce theory rather than a parent-subsidiary relationship. 67 In
dictum the court noted that when a foreign corporation has a Texas sub-
sidiary, jurisdiction over the parent depends upon the acts of the parent, not
of the subsidiary. 1 The court further remarked, although somewhat ambigu-
ously, that International Shoe's minimum contacts test could be utilized to
determine if there was an agency relationship involved. 69 Another Texas
court, in Country Clubs, Inc. v. Ward,17' a full faith and credit case, found the
fact that the non-resident Texas corporation owned seventy percent of the
Kentucky corporation's stock was insufficient for jurisdictional purposes.
The court, therefore, refused to give full faith and credit to Kentucky's
default judgment against the Texas corporation. Notably, the court did not
look at the overall control exercised by the Texas corporation over the
Kentucky corporation but rather at the contacts between the two corpora-
163. The most significant federal case in this area is Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
267 U.S. 333 (1925), in which the Supreme Court held that even though the parent corporation
owned the subsidiary's entire capital stock and exerted its "control both commercially and
financially" over the subsidiary, each corporation maintained a "distinct corporate entity." Id.
at 335. See generally 2 J. MOORE, supra note Il, 4.25[6]; 4 C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER, supra note
11, § 1069.
164. See generally 2 J. MOORE, supra note 11, 4.25[6]; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 52 (1971) (jurisdiction over the subsidiary will establish jurisdiction over the
foreign parent if the foreign parent controls and dominates the subsidiary so that it disregards the
subsidiary's independent status).
165. See, e.g., Curb-Cone, Inc. v. Wood, a state district court case reported in 27 TEX. B.J. 235
(1964).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 275.
168. Id. at 236.
169. Id.
170. 461 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writref'dn.r.e.);seeThomas, Conflictof
Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 191, 197-98 (1972).
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tions in relation to the contract that formed the basis of the cause of action. 7'
Four significant cases decided in the federal district courts demonstrate the
inability of article 2031 b to encompass the parent-subsidiary relationship. The
first case is Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.172 in which a cause of
action was brought for breach of contract against a franchise food corpora-
tion, Colonel Sanders' Inn, Inc. (CSI), and its parent corporation, Kentucky
Fried Chicken Corp. (KFC). The plaintiff had contracted with CSI to sell a
motel to CSI in exchange for stock in KFC which CSI would cause to be
issued. 7 3 The court did not analyze the factual circumstances in terms of the
statute but proceeded directly to the three due process criteria set forth in
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.'74 and concluded that the second criterion of
O'Brien,175 which is also a literal requirement of article 203 1 b, 76 had not been
met in that the cause of action which was grounded in the plaintiff's contract
with CSI was unrelated to the franchise relationship between KFC and CSI. 177
Although recognizing that subjecting KFC to the jurisdiction of the forum
solely on the basis of the franchise relationship would not violate due process,
the court refused to do so because Texas had not chosen to act in this area. 178
Having decided that the cause of the action was unrelated to KFC's contacts
with Texas, the court went on to exercise jurisdiction over the parent corpora-
tion on the theory that KFC was a party to the contract between the plaintiff
and CSI. 17 Noting that KFC owned ninety-five percent of CSI's stock and
controlled its board of directors, the court boldly stated that "[s]uch power is
enough to suggest that KFC was controlling CSI in the making of these motel
acquisition contracts and was actually doing business through CSI.' 180 The
court even went so far as to say that "KFC played a substantial role in the
formulation of the contract"'' to justify its holding, yet earlier inthe opinion
the court had admitted that KFC's contacts with Texas were unrelated to the
contract between the plaintiff and CSI. Indeed, the court was creating a
fiction of KFC's "doing business" by "entering into a contract" in order to
justify exercising jurisdiction over the parent corporation.
Reul v. Sahara Hotel,'82 rendered by the same federal district court that
171. 461 S.W.2d at 657-58. But cf. Curry v. Dell Publishing Co., 438 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the defendant parent corporation published and
sold a magazine with allegedly libelous materials to its wholly owned subsidiary corporation.
Although service over the defendant was not perfected due to procedural problems, the court
questioned the parent corporation's ability to shield itself from liability in light of its knowledge
"that the magazine would have national circulation and, if libelous, the article could cause untold
harm." Id. at 891.
172. 338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1971); see Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 182, 183 (1973).
173. 338 F. Supp. at 872-73.
174. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966); see notes 95-102 supra and accompanying text.
175. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
176. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (1964).
177. 338 F. Supp. at 874-75.
178. Id.; see notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
179. 338 F. Supp. at 875. But cf. Pliler v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. (Texas), 197 F. Supp. 212
(S.D. Tex. 1961) (no jurisdiction over parent corporation when the cause of action did not arise
out of the insubstantial contacts of the parent corporation with the forum).
180. 338 F. Supp. at 876 (court's emphasis).
181. Id.
182. 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974); see Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 265, 266 (1975).
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decided Kentucky Fried Chicken, represents the most expansive application
of the parent-subsidiary relationship. The Texas plaintiff was injured in
Nevada by a tank manufactured by a corporation with a permit to do business
in Texas. Unlike Kentucky Fried Chicken in which jurisdiction was exercised
over the parent corporation due to its control over the Texas subsidiary, the
plaintiff in Reul sought to have service brought on a non-resident subsidiary
of the Texas parent corporation. The court indicated, without elaborating,
that the legal test of liability is more stringent than the legal test relating to in
personam jurisdiction, 183 and found that the subsidiary corporation had
"clearly not committed a tort in Texas nor entered into a contract to be
performed in Texas."'" Resolving that the catchall phrase in article 2031b
was an "inelegant attempt to keep the statute from being limited to torts and
contracts," the court exercised jurisdiction over the subsidiary corporation,
holding that the subsidiary's "very relationship with its parent corporation
gives rise to a situation in which its 'acts. .. constitute doing business.' "185
In citing the proposition in O'Brien that the " 'cause of action must arise
from, or be connected with, such act or transaction,' "186 the court apparently
used the "or connected with" language to mean that the defendant's liability
producing acts are similar to acts done in Texas.
The court recognized a further statutory problem in that the cause of action
did not arise out of the subsidiary's contacts with the state,'87 but reconciled
its decision by stating that the cause of action was "connected with the
parent's activities in Texas."'188 The court's analysis was further strained in
that, unlike the case in Kentucky Fried Chicken, the Reulcourt could not base
its holding on a control theory since the subsidiary was being subjected to the
jurisdiction of Texas by way of the parent corporation. The court's analysis
focused on an alter ego theory rather than a control test.189
The third federal district court decision, Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 9 involved an alleged patent infringement. Although the non-
resident parent corporation entirely owned a subsidiary authorized to do
business in Texas, guaranteed the debt of the subsidiary, and controlled four
out of five members of the subsidiary's board of directors, the court held that
the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of actual control of the
internal affairs of the subsidiary by the parent corporation. Finding that the
subsidiary enjoyed independent responsibility for its management and day-
to-day operations, the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the sub-
sidiary and parent corporations were alter egos. ' 9' By primarily grounding its
183. 372 F. Supp. at 997.
184. Id. at 998.
185. Id.; cf. Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1964) ("close economic business ties" were sufficient to subject parent corporation to jurisdic-
tion through subsidiary's contacts with state under Florida long-arm statutes); see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 48.181(3) (1969) (providing that any corporation which through its distributors sells to any
corporation in the state, shall be conclusively presumed to be conducting business).
186. 399 S.W.2d at 342.
187. 372 F. Supp. at 1002.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 998-1002.
190. 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973); see Baade, supra note 45, at 174.
191. 364 F. Supp. at 250.
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decision on the Supreme Court case Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co.,192 the Frito-Lay court suggested that it might not violate due
process to entertain jurisdiction in this type of case, but that the Supreme
Court had not yet modified its position in Cannon. ]93
The most significant Fifth Circuit decision in this area is Cousteau,194 in
which the plaintiff contended that an agency relationship existed between a
subsidiary corporation undisputedly within the reach of article 2031 b and its
parent corporation. Although the court found no evidence of an agency or
parent-subsidiary relationship, 95 it remarked that, assuming that there was
such a relationship, the type of control necessary to impute to the parent
corporation the activities of the subsidiary was lacking. "The Cousteau court
placed much weight on the failure of the plaintiff to establish prima facie
evidence that the subsidiary acted with either actual or apparent authority of
the parent corporation.197 The court did not clearly delineate a distinction
between an agency relationship and a parent-subsidiary relationship.
C. A Proposal
The issues of whether the cause of action must be connected with the
defendant's contacts with the forum, and the difficult question of jurisdiction
based on parent-subsidiary relationships, demonstrate the inherent weaknes-
ses of article 2031 b. Although the draftsmen of the long-arm statute probably
intended the statute to extend to the limits of due process as set forth in
International Shoe, the "doing business" language is clearly a vestige of the
fictions that developed after Pennoyer. It does indeed appear strange to label a
tort as "doing business." The catchall phrase in section four of the statute
simply does not contemplate the necessary considerations in parent-
subsidiary relationships.
The basic flaw of article 2031b is that it attempts to expand long-arm
jurisdiction by menas of specific criteria rather than by providing a com-
prehensive concept of jurisdiction in the context of due process. The Su-
preme Court recognized this hazard in International Shoe when it remarked
that the "criteria. . . cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative."' 98 Due
process is a term used to describe the limitation placed on the power of
government to act, yet the courts' perception of this limitation is in a constant
state of flux. The emphasis of article 203 lb should be directed at the theory
rather than the application of due process since the concept of due process in
192. 267 U.S. 333 (1925); see note 163 supra and accompanying text.
193. 364 F. Supp. at 248-49.
194. See Figari, supra note 182, at 265-66; Thomas, supra note 45, at 246-47; cf. Turner v.
Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir. 1965) ("common stock ownership
and/or identity of officers do not in themselves establish the agency relationship"). See also Gray
Co. v. Ward, 145 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt. cor.) (agent of
corporation subjects corporation to jurisdiction).
195. 495 F.2d at 493.
196. Id. Cousteau also changed the plaintiff's burden of proof from a showing of a prima facie
cause of action to prima facie evidence.
197. Id. at 493; see Murdock v. Volvo of America Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Tex. 1975)
(plaintiff failed to meet Cousteau's prima facie showing of control and agency relationship). The
Murdock court remarked that the Cousteau case restated the Supreme Court's decision in
Cannon. 403 F. Supp. at 57. See generally Kurland, supra note 11, at 569-86.
198. 326 U.S. at 319.
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its purest sense is idealistic, while its implementation is expressed in count-
less different ways according to the facts of a particular situation. The
variances that account for these differences in the application of due process
are deeply embedded in such factors as economics, politics, and technology.
Long-arm statutes are far from uniform, and commentators have yet to find
a truly acceptable one. If the statute delineates specific criteria, it may
provide guidelines for litigants but is likely to include less than the full extent
of due process. State and federal courts interpreting article 203 1b have been
forced to avoid statutory construction of article 2031 b in certain areas in order
to "expand" the statute to the limits of due process. If, on the other hand, the
statute is of the California type, 199 which simply states that the court has
power to "exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution," it avoids the dangers of statutory construction falling short of due
process limitations but is even more vague than International Shoe's
"minimum contacts." 2°°
The upshot of this dilemma focuses on the fundamental tensions in the
theory of in personam jurisdiction. The specific criteria of any long-arm
statute have roots grounded in the traditional "presence" theory of Pennoyer
while at least part of the due process concept of International Shoe is prem-
ised on an examination of all the relevant factors in exercising jurisdiction.
Although an examination of all the relevant factors is at the very heart of "fair
play and substantial justice," it is far from evident that International Shoe's
"minimum contacts" test was a break from the concept of presence so firmly
entrenched in jurisdictional theory. 20' No statutory panacea is offered here. A
statute is presented, however, that aspires to the same degree of flexibility of
California's statute, yet contains factors to be considered in determining
whether due process will permit the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular
situation.
Proposed Long-Arm Statute
Section 1. Any person who does any act, or causes any consequences 20 2
in this state 20 3 or who does any act, or causes any consequences outside
of this State that may have foreseeable consequences in this State, 2°4
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State for any claim
for relief or cause of action 205 to the extent that it is not inconsistent with
due process of law. 206
199. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
200. See Gorfinkel & Lavine, supra note 24, at 1165-69; Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or
Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249, 265-67 (1959);
Note, In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: An Interest-Balancing Test, 20 U.
FLA. L. REV. 33, 48-53 (1967).
201. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note II.
202. More than physical acts are contemplated by the statute. See generally Reese & Galston,
Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdictions, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249
(1959).
203. The "presence" concept of article 2031b is retained.
204. The primary expansion of the statute to meet the limits of due process is in this phrase.
205. Both terms are used so as not to limit relief and thus fragment claims being brought. See
UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). See generally C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (2d ed. 1970).
206. This phrase is taken from the California long-arm statute. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10
(West 1973).
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Section 2. In determining whether the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion is consistent with due process the courts of this State shall consider
any relevant factors.20 7 Factors that may be considered by the courts
include, but are not limited to:208
2.1) the existence of a contract related to a person, subject matter, or
occurrence within this State;2"
2.2) the commission of a tort or the possible existence of tort liability
related to a person, subject matter, or occurrence within this State;
2.3) any transaction entered into or carried out purposefully which
invokes the protection of the laws of this State;21" '
2.4) the quality, nature and extent of the activity in this State;212
2.5) the existence or non-existence of a relation between the claim for
relief or cause of action and the person's contacts with the State;213
2.6) the fairness and reasonableness of requiring a person to defend the
action ;214
2.7) any special interests this State has in exercising jurisdiction.2 15
Section 3. For purposes of this Article, "person" includes an individual,
his executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corpo-
ration, partnership, association, or any other legal or commercial entity,
whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of this state and whether or not
organized under the laws of this state.21 6
Section 4. The provisions of this section shall be cumulative of other
jurisdictional statutes including, but not limited to, the following: 217
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.11, 8.10 (1956);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Supp. 1976-77);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.65, 3.66 (1963);
TEX. NON-PROFIT CORP. ACT ANN. art. 1396-8.09 (1962);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2032, 2033a, 2033b, 2039a (1964).
207. The court is required to consider any and all factors that due process demands it to
consider in exercising jurisdiction.
208. The court is not required to consider each of these factors in every case. This is not a
checklist; instead, this list provides assistance to a court in its decision as to whether the exercise
of jurisdiction is in accordance with due process. In some fact situations all of these factors may
be relevant; in others, few if any may be relevant. Depending on the circumstances of a particular
case, the court may emphasize one factor more than another.
209. No longer is the emphasis necessarily on the performance of a contract. Solicitation,
preliminary negotiations, and the execution of a contract may be relevant to the court's consider-
ation of whether to exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arthur, Ross & Peters v. Housing, Inc., 508
F.2d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 1975) ("performance, rather than execution, should govern the determina-
tion of jurisdiction").
210. This expands the tort concept to the limits of due process. Unless the present statute is
construed to be something that it is not, it is doubtful that jurisdiction could be obtained under any
circumstances when both the tortious act and the injury occurred out of state to a Texas resident.
This statute permits the courts to consider exercise of jurisdiction whenever tort liability is
involved as long as due process is satisfied.
211. This is adopted from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
212. This is adopted from the O'Brien test. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
213. In some instances it may be important to ascertain whether the cause of action is
connected to the contacts with the state. In other situations, however, this consideration may be
irrelevant.
214. These criteria were adopted from Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483,
494 (5th Cir: 1974).
215. Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1963), is the source
for this factor.
216. This third section is the definition of "person" in UNIFORM INTERSTATE & INT'L PROCE-
DURE ACT § 1.01.
217. This list is not necessarily meant to be inclusive.
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Section 5. The manner of service of process shall be effected pursuant to
TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 or any other rules promulgated by the Texas Supreme
Court in accordance with the notice requirements of due process.
Whenever service of process of a non-resident defendant pursuant to
TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 is impractical, 218 the court may, on motion, prescribe
a different method of service, if the court finds, and so recites in its
order, that the method so prescribed would be likely to give the defen-
dant actual notice. 21 9
IV. CONCLUSION
If article 203 1b is retained in its present form, courts will continue to have
difficulty applying it to certain situations. The universal tendency of the
courts, especially on the federal level, has been to interpret the Texas long-
arm statute as reaching to the limits of due process. The Texas Supreme Court
has been reluctant to speak on article 2031 b, but the "to the limits " interpreta-
tion by many state and federal courts has often produced desirable results.
Although the supreme court could decide judicially that the statute reaches
the limits of due process, the decision would create an even stronger prece-
dent for further strained analyses in various factual circumstances. The best
course is legislative action to provide a means to implement the principles set
forth in International Shoe.
The legal issues surrounding in personam jurisdiction are at best enigmatic
and at worst unintelligible. The study of long-arm statutes exposes and
accentuates the problematic nature of jurisdiction theory. Article 2031 b was
enacted shortly after the last of the major decisions by the Supreme Court
pertaining to in personam jurisdiction. Since that time article 203 lb and other
state long-arm statutes have been subject to a vast amount of interpretation
and discussion from commentators and courts alike. As our world increas-
ingly becomes smaller and our society more complex, the significance of the
issues relevant to the power of a state to exercise jurisdiction is greatly
heightened. It is hoped that legislative bodies as well as the judiciary will
begin to perceive jurisdiction not simply in terms of specific criteria but in
light of "fair play and substantial justice."
218. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 106.
219. Id. 109a.
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